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Abstract
The operating system of an IC card should provide an
appropriate interface to applications using IC cards. An
incorrect choice of operations and data renders the card
inefcient and cumbersome. The design principles of
the UNIX operating system are most appropriate for IC
card operating system design. The actual design that we
recognise as UNIX (or any other current operating sys-
tem for that matter) is not appropriate for IC cards.
1 Introduction
An IC card (or smart card) is a complete computer
housed in a piece of plastic the same size as a credit
card. In most systems, the computer communicates with
a terminal via half a dozen contacts on the surface of the
card. Some of these contacts supply the power to the
computer. The card currently nds its use in providing
off-line security in widely deployed service systems like
debit and credit cards. Its future use will also be to pro-
vide user centred personal security to Information Tech-
nology services as will be develop along side the infa-
mous information super highway [6].
Embedded in a thin, exible plastic card, an IC card
computer has to be small to reduce the risk of mechan-
ical problems. Because of these mechanical constraints,
as well as aspects of cost, the current generation of IC
cards typically contains only a small 8-bit micro proces-
sor, a few hundred bytes of RAM, a couple of Kbytes of
ROM and a few Kbytes of non-volatile memory in the
form of EEPROM. This small size constrains the free-
dom in design of software that has to run on an IC card
processor, and also places restrictions on the develop-
ment methods that can be used.
An IC card operating system provides the processing
and storage facilities that enable an application provider
to implement specic card applications with exibility
and ease. The term `Application Provider' is used here
to refer to the organisation that uses a smart card as part
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of a product or service, and is responsible for the oper-
ations performed by the card. Current IC card operat-
ing systems are modelled on DOS-like le systems, with
les and directories. A set of commands interpreted by
the operating system provides for basic data access op-
erations. Security is supported by access conditions as-
sociated with les and directories.
A recently adopted ISO standard [4] based on this
data structuring method has been complemented with
industry standards such as the joint initiative by Mas-
tercard, Visa and Europay or the mainly European GSM
mobile phone industry. Commands are dened in these
standards with particular focus on format; command se-
mantics and consistency of the command set are poorly
expressed. Actually available operating systems sup-
port arbitrary subsets of the standardised commands
augmented with proprietary functions. Some operating
systems offer the use of cryptographic protocols to sat-
isfy access conditions. IC card operating systems based
on the le system model tend to require lengthy se-
quences of commands to retrieve or modify a data ele-
ment stored on the card.
We subscribe to a somewhat different view: the card
operating system should foremost present the IC card
as a processing element rather than as a storage compo-
nent. This allows the card to communicate with its en-
vironment in a client-server fashion. In the client-server
approach, card applications can be designed as objects
containing persistent data, access methods and security
procedures [1], leveraging on the wide experience in de-
veloping object based software. Such an operating sys-
tem provides the application designer with a powerful
set of instructions to effectively express the transactional
nature of the card communication. Applications imple-
mented in this way will require a few, short commands
to implement a transaction.
2 Hardware
One of the most important factors that distinguish an
IC card from a normal computer is that the latter has
disks as non-volatile memory. In IC cards EE-prom is
used instead because it is smaller and can be integrated
on chip. EE technology in early IC cards at the begin-
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ning of the seventies made it difcult to store informa-
tion reliably. The capacity of the non-volatile memory
was also small. Over the past 20 years, EE technology
has been improved considerably. Both the capacity of
memory devices and the reliability of the devices has in-
creased. An interesting observation on the hardware as-
pects of smart cards is that the price of IC cards has not
changed much, the main reason being that the techno-
logical advances have not been returned in the form of
a lower price but in the form of increased functionality
and memory reliability and capacity.
A major technological challenge in building an IC
card is to design non volatile memory such that it is
small in size and can be rewritten as often as we like.
The current state of the art does not allow more than
between 1,000 and 10,000 rewrites of a single memory
cell. Rewritingmemory requires the use of high voltages
(15V) which stresses the silicon especially the thin ox-
ide insulation used to implement the memory cell. With
the use of additional memory cells and of error correct-
ing codes non-volatile memories can be built that allow
storage to be rewritten over 100,000 times. Even with
such relative high numbers it remains impossible to use
non-volatile memory as we would use memory on our
PCs and work stations, First of all, the operating sys-
tem must at all times be aware which locations it is us-
ing and re-using. Secondly the software tools used to
build IC card applicationsmustminimise the use of non-
volatile memory. It must certainly not be used as tempo-
rary storage for program variables and the like.
The advances in non-volatilememory technology rep-
resent a signicant feat of engineering. Because these
advances are hardly visible, they are not appreciated by
most of us, who are working with PCs and work sta-
tions. It would simply be unthinkable that a memory or
a disk would wear out after being written to about 1000
times. Clearly, limitations that the underlying hardware
present should be taken into account by the IC card op-
erating system. More interestingly, addressing such lim-
itations should be conned to the kernel of the operat-
ing system. In particular the applications programmer
should not have to worry about this problem.
3 Software
The hardware development in IC card design has been
followed closely by the development of IC card operat-
ing systems. Before smart cards appeared, simple mem-
ory cards were used, either with magnetic stripes or
with memory chips. There is not much that one can
do about the interface to a memory card: it can be read
and written at various different addresses. There is more
freedom in the design of the interface to an IC card.
Many systems designers have taken the view that really
an IC card is still some kind of a gloried memory card.
Addresses have become le names, and the words have
become les. In short the interface is that of a le sys-
tem. This is not only the next logical step up from a
memory card to something more accomplished, but it is
also inspired by the pervasive need for security. In the
minds of many security and access permissions are as-
sociated with les. Therefore, to build a system that of-
fers secure and private access to data means to build a
le system. File systems come in many varieties, and
a prominent one is of course the MS DOS le system.
This systemhas basically been designed for a single user
to control the entire le store. This suited early IC card
designers nicely, as most early IC card applications re-
quired the exclusive use of the card. Two or more ap-
plications co-existing on a single card was not consid-
ered good business practice, because how can one card
issuer trust another? To the ordinary users of IC cards
(and other cards for that matter), to have a large collec-
tion of cards, all for different purposes, is not attractive.
Presently, a number of IC cards are being offered ex-
plicitly qualied as `multi-function'. The ISO standard
also claims to provide support for multiple applications
on a single card. Clearly multi-functionality (or multi-
programming in the more standard operating system
jargon) makes entirely new demands on the IC card op-
erating system, which are difcult to accommodate by
an MS DOS style operating system. However the per-
vading view held by IC card system designers is to stay
as closely as possible to tried and tested designs.
The strength of UNIX is that it offers conceptually
simple interfaces to the facilities offered by the system
through les. In principle, all you need to know about as
an application programmer is that everything in UNIX
is really a le, or, more accurately, a stream of bytes.
Common operations on a stream of bytes are reading,
writing, and positioning. Whenever possible, such op-
erations have been given a sensible meaning for I/O
devices, which are also accessed as a stream of bytes.
Clearly, this uniform and conceptually clean interface
comes with a price: The system is rather open and it is
difcult to protect one user from another. In fact UNIX
uses only a simple set of bits associated with each le to
support access restrictions. It seems unlikely that imitat-
ing the functionality of the UNIX kernel on an IC card
could offer the exibility and security that we require.
Instead of imitating the result, one should embrace the
design principles of UNIX and analyse the requirements
of smart cards and the transactional applications they
will be used for. Thus, an entirely new operating system
should be built specic to the particularities of the use of
cards. The result would be a system that offers clear and
simple interfaces to the storage being held on the card,
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whilst providing tight security.
4 System
From the point of view of an IC card system one should
look not only at the card and its software but also at the
integration of the card in the systemas a whole. In many
cases the following simplied client-server view on the
systemwill sufce. This consists of a card (the server), a
card reader with some other, larger computer connected
to the reader (the client). In principle the card user car-
ries the card from terminal to terminal, carrying out his
or her business, and the terminals with their associated
computers see only some of the transactions that a user
makes. In the case of an electronic purse, or stored value
card, for example, one terminal could serve to charge
the card with electronic money, and an other terminal
would be used to discharge the card, to make electronic
payments.
The physical reality is thus that the card needs to com-
municate with a card reader, which in turn needs to
communicate with some larger computer. This physical
reality has caused many to think about an IC card as no
more than a peripheral, with a peripheral interface: us-
ing the card means to connect the peripheral to the com-
puter, which is then in complete control. The responsi-
bility for the dialogue rests for the larger part with the
terminal.
Memory cards show this quite clearly as really all we
can do is communicate to the memory an address and
a read command, so that it will return the data corre-
sponding to that address (If no errors occur). This is
how any memory device works. The case of an IC card
is somewhat more complicated as the card has its inter-
nal interfaces, to the EEPROM, ROM and RAM as well
as an external interface to the reader. From the point of
view of the reader in a traditional approach, the card is
nothing more than a le system device, which we can
send a le name, and a read command so that the card
may return the requested information (provided no er-
rors are encountered). The terminal would then pro-
cess the information read and it may subsequently de-
cide to write information back into the le system. Set-
ting aside the added intelligence of using cryptographic
techniques to encode information and to enable autho-
risation to be certied, in this traditional approach the
change is really small from a memory card to a `smart'
card.
We believe that a smart card should not be given a le
system interface but a security interface. The commands
that are issued to the card are not simply an unstruc-
tured sequence of commands but a structured dialogue.
This consists of opening an application, conducting a di-
alogue with the opened application in terms meaning-
ful to that application and then closing the application
again. The crucial point is that the security is delivered
by the protocol that governs the dialogue between card
and terminal. When sending an `open application' com-
mand from the terminal to the card, extra information
should be sent along, so that the card may check that the
terminal, or any communicating party it represents, is
indeed what it pretends to be. In this manner the card
can allow or disallow the terminal to enter into a dia-
logue with it. Then, in its answer to the open application
command, the card presents its credentials to the termi-
nal, which may decide to accept or reject the card. There
are of course more detailed arrangements to be made,
as the better cryptographic protocols require more than
just one action/reaction step. The principle should be
clear: security comes rst, and it must be embedded in a
clearly structured dialogue.
The client-server approach is widely practiced in dis-
tributed computing. Really, nothing is new here, for the
card and the terminal form part of a distributed comput-
ing system, and even a heterogeneous one. The realisa-
tion of this simple fact allows us to import a whole body
of knowledge about building distributed systems. The
crucial extra factor in the case of building IC card based
systems is that they are so tiny. It just would not be sen-
sible to try to run even the smallest of distributed oper-
ating systems kernels on an IC card.
5 Standards and their
implementation
The principles that we have laid out in the preceding
sections are all well and good, but the reality is that IC
card systems are not built according to these principles.
The situation is actually rather worse as considerable ef-
fort is being spent on developing standards for IC cards
in all sorts of application areas. Clearly standards are
necessary to govern the behaviour of the cards, because
otherwise they would all be incompatible and create a
real nuisance to the user rather than to make life easier.
Developing standards is not an easy thing, as they are
based on tried and tested technology and, more impor-
tantly, compromises driven by commercial interests. A
novel view is sometimes embraced by standardisation
committees but not often so. In the present domain there
are a number of important standards all elaborating the
le system interface:
ISO 7816-4 Part of the ISO 7816 series of standards on
smart cards from ISO JTC1/SC17; after a four year
process adopted in March 1995.
EN726 From working group TE9 of the European
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Telecommunication Standardisation Institute (ETSI)
in Soa Antipolis (Nice, France) for pay phone and
calling cards. Although its adoption predates the
ISO standard, the le and directory structure and
many of the commands it denes are compatible
with ISO.
GSM The subscriber identication module of the GSM
mobile telephone network, originating from ETSI.
According to the application specic denitions in
this standard the SIM smart card provides some of
the security to the network. It is further extensively
used as a personal storage device holding phone
numbers and messages.
EMV The result of a joint working group consisting of
Europay, Mastercard and Visa, which published its
most recent documents in early 1995. This stan-
dardization effort aims to dene a core set of ISO
commands for use in the banking industry.
In contrast, an application specic standard developed
in Europe, EN1546 [2], by TC224 WG10, on stored value
cards completely ignores a possible le and record struc-
ture on the card and denes a comprehensive set of spe-
cic commands. A mapping of the application card data
on a le structure is provided in an informative annex.
Mostmanufacturers of smart cards have implemented
operational software for smart cards supporting a le
and directory structure. Some of those currently found
on the market are:
TB100 Made by BULL CP8 in France this operating sys-
tem is one of the rst to implement directories and
les.
MCOS, MPCOS These operating systems are made by
GEMPLUS in France and are of more recent date.
They provide application specic coding through
`lters' loaded in the EEPROM.
OSCAR This operating system has been created by GIS
in England and is used by OKI. It has a proprietary
approach to multi application support in providing
`virtual cards',
MFC The Multi Function Card created by IBM in Ger-
many is the most recent implementation of a le
and directory structure in smart cards. It supports
the basic command set dened in the ETSI standard
and provides facilities to include additional appli-
cation specic commands.
The commands supported by IC cards usually are a
subset of the ISO denition, and often support these
commands with part of the functionality. All operat-
ing systems provide additional commands for mainte-
nance: creating les and directories, allocating memory
and specifying access conditions. Most operating sys-
tems provide facilities to add executable code to mod-
ify the command behaviour or to dene additional com-
mands. Despite the multiple application structure of-
cially adhered to in many cases the operating system is
created with embedded application specic code. This
effectively results in a single application smart card. As
the OS code is placed in the card's ROM a new appli-
cation often requires the denition of a new ROM mask
and incurs the costs and delays of silicon fabrication.
An alternative approach has been taken by QC Tech-
nology of The Netherlands and Integrity Arts of San
Francisco in the design and implementation of the Mac-
sime smart card software technology. Based on a com-
pact operating system kernel application code is loaded
in EEprom in the form of applets. The applet is inter-
preted by the kernel to implement any number of appli-
cation specic commands as required by the application
designer. Portability of the kernel is realised by imple-
menting it in an abstract processor language that is in-
terpreted in the card. In addition to compactness, such
an abstract interpreted language allows the inclusion of
run-time security checks on the executed code. With this
feature the application designer can be allowed to pro-
gram the required functions in the card without risk to
other applications loaded in the same card.
Interoperability between card terminals is provided
by loading a `script' in the terminal that is interpreted
to perform the application functions in a terminal as re-
quested by the user. The terminal script is compiled
from the same source code as the card applet and there-
fore guarantees that card and terminal use the same ap-
plication specic commands.
Interoperability between multiple applications is as-
sured by the use of a single xed command that is recog-
nised by all applications. This `open application' com-
mand is interpreted by the kernel rst to create an execu-
tion context for the application, much like the UNIX pro-
cess, and secondly to initialize the application by calling
a procedure dened for that purpose in the applet code.
Unlike a UNIX process however, an application can de-
ne a number of execution contexts, each designed to
support a specic aspect of the application. Execution
contexts can be dened for initialization of non-volatile
application memory with cryptographic keys or a user
name, for key management or for general use. To this
end each execution context denes a specic set of ac-
cess conditions for the application data shared by all
contexts. The open application command species the
particular execution context to be activated for the cur-
rent terminal and may in addition provide data to (cryp-
tographically) authenticate the activation of the applica-
tion and execution context at that terminal. The Mac-
sime technology is the rst known implementation of an
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open operating system for smart cards that securely pro-
vides for multiple applications sharing the card memory
and processor. The application of formal methods to its
design and implementation has been one of the design
objectives [3].
6 Methodology
Card operating systems are different from most other
operating systems in the sense that the need to provide
security should pervade all levels of the system and all
possible ways in which it is used. In particular this
means that the development methods used in building
a card operating system must take security into account
right from the start and at all levels. The use of for-
mal methods is the key to success here. An ideal design
would consist only of formally specied hardware and
software components. Verication procedures would
make it possible for an independent body to certify that
the implementations used indeed satisfy the specica-
tions. Such verication procedures are described in the
ITSEC guidelines [5].
The use of formal methods to support the construc-
tion of a fully edged operating system does present
problems that should not be underestimated. Firstly the
software industry is perhaps more used to engineering
methods using informal designs. Such designs may con-
sist of diagrams and descriptions of processes in nat-
ural language. Replacing tried and tested engineering
methods by something else will encounter difculties.
Not least people will have to see the benets of a new
method before they may consider embracing it. This is
one hurdle that should be overcome. Secondly, the costs
associated with the use of formal methods will often
be higher than with the use of informal methods. The
extra security and reliability naturally carries a price.
Thirdly, systems should be designed for change. It is
rarely the case that a rst design is the ultimate design,
so there will be changes. Formal methods can be ap-
plied in such a way that changes can be made. This can
be accomplished by using adequate support tools that
carry out reasoning about a design as well as the genera-
tion of support documents and even the code. Planning
for change requires planning the development process,
such that the development process can be reiterated at a
reasonable cost.
7 Conclusions
As single chip computers embedded in a thin plastic
card, smart cards only have limited resources for com-
putation and data storage. Advances in silicon technol-
ogy nd their way in smart cards with a delay. They are
moderated by the essential non volatile on chip mem-
ory and mechanical constraints. However, deployed
as extension to the desk top computer the smart card
promises enhanced security services available to IT in-
dividual system users.
Embedded smart card software is rapidly overcom-
ing the initial preoccupation with hardware memory ac-
cess procedures. The software evolves into a truly open
smart card operating system supporting multiple inde-
pendent applications. The different card applications
provide for a range of security software products.
The operating system of a smart card can be seen as a
security critical system component. Distributed in mil-
lions, smart cards with their restricted resources support
applications where transferred values are mainly pro-
tected by the strength provided by the operating soft-
ware.
A smart card operating system provides the pro-
cessing and storage facilities that enable an application
provider to implement specic card applications with
exibility and ease. Current smart card operating sys-
tems are modelled on classical operating systems, with
les and directories. We argue that the resulting systems
are too general and too large to be effective.
Our view on smart card operating systems regards the
smart card as a co-processing element that communi-
cates with a host in client-server fashion. Applications
are designed as objects containing persistent data, access
methods and security procedures. Our system offers a
powerful and secure instruction set that requires a few,
short commands to implement a transaction.
We use formal methods to support and verify the de-
sign of the system. The basic principle is to design the
system in a strictly hierarchical fashion. The function-
ality at each level in the hierarchy can then be formally
specied in a compositional fashion. Compilers and
software tools to support the system and application de-
velopment are built on the basis of the formal specica-
tions. The use of formal methods is feasible and cost ef-
fective because a smart card operating system is simpler
than a general purpose operating system.
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